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The Militia – an Outline
Today the word "militia" suggests bands of fanatical troops loyal to rebel warlords in distant lands. But in English history it was an orderly system which provided a reserve of civilian troops to counter threats of invasion or internal unrest. Operated at first by regional lords, and later by the counties, it lasted through the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries.
For five centuries before that – from the Norman Conquest – feudal arrangements had provided horsed troops to form the backbone of armies at home. But in the middle of the 16th century the introduction of firearms upset the primacy of knights in armour, and warfare gradually changed. So at the start of the 17th century, with memories of the Spanish Armada fresh, “Commissions of Array" were appointed within the counties to organise a “general levy”, and all able-bodied persons were registered on muster rolls and sorted into bands. Households were assessed according to their status in order to provide weapons, armour, horses, or their monetary equivalent, and men were trained and exercised at the expense of the parishes in the county. This Militia was supposed to muster for training from time to time, but it rarely happened, so they were ill-prepared for emergencies, and could not be relied on for service outside their own counties.
This unsatisfactory state of affairs led to the creation, especially in London, of elite forces which met regularly and were known as “trained bands”. In the Civil War the City of London trained bands performed well for the Parliamentary side, but otherwise neither side made much use of the Militia. In many counties there was a royalist lord while local trade was linked to (Parliamentary) guilds – so ordinary folk were wary of taking sides. (Monmouth had the wealthy royalist Marquis of Worcester – but also strong Haberdasher influence.)
By 1660 the nation was in a state of misery, having suffered a civil war and beheaded a king, only to then endure a puritanical Protectorate enforced by soldiers. So at the Restoration of the Monarchy there was a dread of standing armies, and a naive hope that, if a strong navy could deter invasion, the nation might manage with just a “constitutional force” – i.e. local militias – to maintain order. Armies would be raised to fight abroad but would then be stood down. (Thus initially Charles II was allowed regiments of guards to protect his life and his household, but not a standing army.) However it was a naive hope as the Militia was too inefficient for such a role.
In the following reign James II tried to take control of the Army by packing it with Catholic officers – until he was ousted. Then, as William and Mary came to the throne, it was agreed that the monarch would command the Army, but only with the consent of Parliament – which would approve military funds for just one year at a time. This 1689 Bill of Rights also stated that “the subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their defence suitable to their conditions and as allowed by law" – wording which seemed to legitimise the Militia.
But by the time of the two Scottish Jacobite Rebellions the Militia arrangements were so rusty that it could not be properly mobilised – which led eventually to a new Militia Act in 1757. This moved the onus of providing men from the nobility and gentry on to the counties – with ballots run in the parishes. But there were so many exemptions, substitutions and ways of buying-out – even by (illegal) insurance cover – that nearly all the militiamen were labourers. However they were given better uniforms and weapons, and could be “embodied” for training. And there was the hope of boosting recruitment for a Regular Army which was now very stretched around the world.
Similar Militia systems existed in North America and the Channel Islands. But the Irish and the Scots were not entrusted with arms until 1715 and 1797 respectively.
During the wars with post-revolutionary and Napoleonic France there was, at least before the naval victory of Trafalgar, a real fear of invasion. The Militia was embodied into the Army and regiments served at many vulnerable locations on the south coast. Large camps were held at Brighton, and the the Prince Regent reviewed regiments there. The Monmouth and Brecon Militia was actively embodied in this for 22 years, including a stint of 18 months in Ireland. The Militia also proved to be a useful recruiting reserve, and there were bounties for men who transferred into the Regular Army.
After the defeat of Napoleon, and with the Royal Navy so strong, there was little risk of invasion – so musters and the ballot lapsed, and the Militia became very dormant. But then worries arose about civil unrest linked to agitation for electoral reform; and also there were invasion scares over French naval ambitions (and much of Europe was in revolutionary turmoil). The traditional, albeit inefficient, Militia was missed – and so it was resuscitated with a new Militia Act in 1852.
Generous funding replaced the ballot and the Militia grew rapidly as it now attracted men who wanted some military experience, while maintaining their civilian jobs and family life. Recruits underwent basic training at an army depot and then returned to civilian life, and continued with regular training and an annual camp – usually with some time on the rifle ranges. They received military pay and a financial retainer – and tended to regard the annual camp as a paid holiday.
Two years after this resuscitation the Crimean War broke out and the Militia was embodied. Many Militia regiments, led by the Monmouthshires, offered to fund their passage out to the Crimea – but had to settle for garrison duties at home. Slowly, over the years, it became clear that their public order role was being lost to the new police forces, while upstart Volunteer Rifle Corps, asking for less commitment, were attracting many middle-class town dwellers keen to become proficient with the new rifles. The Militia fell behind in numbers – and wondered whether their traditional role would endure in the new urbanised nation – or whether to develop new skills?
The War Office was also now bent on reform, and encouraged a few militias to convert from infantry to artillery. And, in 1877, the militias of Monmouthshire and Anglesey accepted engineer roles – and with a liability to serve overseas in the event of war. Soon afterwards the remaining militia regiments were designated as lower ranking battalions of regiments of the line – so a county infantry regiment would now typically have one regular battalion abroad, one at home – and third and fourth militia battalions. In 1908 these, and the Volunteer Rifle Corps, were merged into a new Territorial Force (leaving a few remaining unaffiliated Militia units to continue in a Special Reserve).
The amateurish county Militias had become obsolete and had become embodied into a national war machine – to use and face the ferocious new weapons now available – as Europe stumbled towards a Great War in which millions would die.
Two units in the British Army still maintain a Militia designation; these being the Royal Monmouthshire Royal Engineers (mustered in 1539) and the Jersey Field Squadron of the Royal Militia Island of Jersey (first formed in 1337). Today, in recognition of this common ancestry, they serve under a unified command.
EGO 2011
